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INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty has been an increasingly central theme in
discussions of competition law in Europe since the beginning of
“modernization” efforts in the 1990s.1 This may seem
paradoxical, because the modernization programs—both
institutional and substantive—were intended to reduce the
range of variation in competition law rules and thereby increase
uniformity and predictability of results throughout the
expanding European Union, and they were justified by claims
that they would achieve these benefits. Does the chorus of
concerns about the lack of predictability in European
competition law mean that the modernization processes were
misguided or that they have failed? In my view, the answer is
“no.” They have, however, transformed and relocated
uncertainty in ways that are seldom adequately recognized and
1. See, e.g., Imelda Maher & Oana Stefan, Competition Law in Europe: The Challenge
of a Network Constitution, in THE REGULATORY STATE: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
178, 189 (Dawn Oliver et al. eds., 2010).
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rarely
addressed.
Insufficient
recognition
of
these
transformations and their implications has wide-ranging and
potentially serious implications for competition law in Europe
and even for global competition law development.2 How then
are we to reconcile the aims of modernization with its
consequences?
A basic theme of this Article is that although the two forms
of modernization have in some ways reduced uncertainty in EU
competition law, they have also generated new forms of
uncertainty that have sometimes concealed and at other times
transformed it. The Article analyzes the impacts of
“modernization” on competition law decision-making in the
European Union and thus on the substance of the law itself. It
identifies the areas and forms of uncertainty that have resulted
from these modernizations. While some commentators have
noted elements of the relationship between modernization and
uncertainty,3 that relationship may be more fundamental to
understanding European competition law than is generally
recognized.
The Article also examines the conceptual tools typically
used in thinking about European competition law and
demonstrates how these can be inadequate for the legal
situation in the wake of modernization. Often they no longer
provide adequate analysis of the complex processes of decisionmaking in Europe today. I then go on to suggest ways in which
these tools can themselves be “modernized” to account for these
changing complexities. In order to deal effectively with
European competition law, it is necessary to use a perspective
that is specifically designed to identify the factors that shape
competition law decisions.
The Article thus has two central objectives. One is to
explore the transformations of uncertainty in European
competition law that impede recognition of the “modernized”
contours of competition law and to identify some of their
2. See generally DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW, MARKETS, AND
GLOBALIZATION 187–204 (2010).
3. See, e.g., Damien M.B. Gerard, The Effects-Based Approach Under Article 101 TEFU
and its Paradoxes: Modernisation at War with Itself?, in TEN YEARS OF EFFECTS-BASED
APPROACH IN EU COMPETITION LAW: STATE OF PLAY AND PERSPECTIVES 18, 18 (Jaques
Bourgeois & Denis Waelbroeck eds., 2012).
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potential consequences. A second objective is to suggest some
modified tools that can be of value in more effectively and
precisely analyzing and understanding competition law in
Europe.
I. THE SEARCH FOR PREDICTABILITY IN EUROPEAN
COMPETITION LAW
Access to the content of laws is a fundamental concern of
law, at least in developed legal systems. This “knowability” of law
is a central factor in its roles, its functions, and its value to those
involved with it or affected by it. Only to the extent that law
provides knowable content can it serve most of the social
purposes that it purports to serve. This means that it can serve
these objectives only where authority-based decisions about the
content of the law can be predicted with reasonable confidence.
In the context of the European Union, the role of predictability
(often referred to as “legal certainty”) takes on additional
functions and dimensions. Law is the basic tool for the
European integration process, and thus the predictability and
stability of its content are central to that process and to the
confidence of EU stakeholders and citizens in the operation of
EU institutions and governance structures. Moreover, EU
citizens demand that law be knowable and reasonably
predictable, so that they can assess their own rights and
obligations within the European Union as well as the obligations
of others. This has been true since the founding of the
European integration institutions, but it has become a
particularly sensitive issue in recent years, as membership in the
European Union has dramatically expanded and EU-level
regulation has penetrated economic and social domains
previously reserved for national institutions. Recent
controversies about the future of European integration
exacerbate concerns about the knowability and predictability of
EU laws.4
Predictability takes on a particularly salient role in
competition law. This area of European law has long played a
4. See, e.g., Paul Taylor, Europe’s Zigzag Course Toward Integration, REUTERS (Dec.
24, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/25/business/international/
europes-zigzag-course-toward-integration.html.
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central role in the process of European integration, not least
because of the centrality of economic development and the role
of the market in that process.5 In addition, competition law has
often been a center of attention in the process of European
integration, not least because it directly affects powerful
economic and sometimes also political interests. It is often a
front-page issue and an immediate concern for business and
economic decision-makers as well as the general public. These
factors further enhance the value of the capacity to “know” the
content of competition law and thus be in a position to predict
competition law decisions.
These concerns have played an important role in efforts to
“modernize” European competition law, which have focused on
the need to reduce the range of variation of norms of economic
conduct within the European Union. I distinguish here between
two forms of modernization.6 One is what I call “institutional
modernization” as represented by the “modernization package”
implemented in 2004.7 This set of reforms included institutional
and procedural changes aimed at greater efficiency and
certainty in European competition law. The second form of
modernization seeks to reduce variations in substantive norms
by using economics to standardize the basis for competition law
decisions. I use the term “substantive modernization” to refer to
this project. It is commonly referred to as a process of
introducing a “more economic approach” (“MEA”) into
European competition law.8 The relationship between these two
related processes is central to issues of predictability and
uncertainty. The Article first looks at these two forms of
5. See generally DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY
EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 334–46 (1998).
6. I examine these two forms of modernization and their interrelationships in
David J. Gerber, Two Forms of Modernization in European Competition Law, 31 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 1235 (2007).
7. Council Regulation 1/2003/EC on the implementation of the Rules on
Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. L 1/1.
8. For discussion, see for example Lars-Hendrik Röller, Economic Analysis and
Competition Policy Enforcement in Europe, in MODELLING EUROPEAN MERGERS: THEORY,
COMPETITION POLICY AND CASE STUDIES 13 (Peter A.G. van Bergeijk & Erik
Kloosterhuis eds., 2005); Arndt Christiansen, The “More Economic Approach” in EU Merger
Control—A Critical Assessment (Deutsche Bank Working Paper Series, Research Notes 21,
2005), available at http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/
PROD0000000000196093/The+%22more+economic+approach%22+in+EU+merger+
control+-+A+critical+assessment.PDF.
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modernization separately and then reviews some of the
relationships that are particularly relevant for the
transformations of uncertainty.
II. INSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION AND THE CLOUDED
ROLES OF INSTITUTIONS
Institutional modernization and its consequences have
played a central role in thinking about EU competition law since
the mid-1990s. Initial plans began evolving in the competition
directorate of the EU Commission (the “Commission”) in the
mid-1990s. As the plans for institutional change took shape
around 2000, it became an important issue at the Member State
level as well. Enactment of the reforms required formal changes
that had to be approved by the Member States, and thus the
process was discussed over a period of years with representatives
of these governments as well as both European and US
competition experts. The “modernization package” was enacted
in 2003, and since then it has been at center stage for all
involved with competition law in Europe. It has been the subject
of volumes of commentary, and its implications continue to be a
major focus of analysis, and a major reference point for
understanding the competition law situation in Europe today.
This institutional modernization process centered on two
objectives—efficiency and uniformity. Both were seen as
necessary to respond to the increasing size and membership of
the European Union. Membership increased to fifteen in 1995,
and the collapse of the Soviet Union seemed very likely to lead
to further increases. Commission leaders recognized that
expansion made the existing competition law procedures
increasingly cumbersome and inefficient. They also realized that
the globalization wave unleashed in the 1990s together with US
economic dynamism during that period created new economic
challenges that called for a more efficient institutional
mechanism. Among the key changes here was elimination of
notification requirements for potentially anticompetitive
agreements as well as elimination of the Commission’s
monopoly on granting exemptions to the prohibition on
agreements restricting competition.
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A. Institutional Modernization, Predictability, and the Search for a
Single Voice
A second major objective of these institutional reforms was
to create greater uniformity and predictability in the rules of
competition law in Europe by requiring that EU competition law
be applied to most conduct that might be considered
anticompetitive.9 Prior to 2004 there was no single voice for
competition law in Europe.10 The EU applied its rules according
to its understanding of its jurisdictional prerogatives, and each
Member State applied its own competition laws on the basis of
its own conceptions of its jurisdictional reach. European Union
competition law had priority in some situations over Member
State law, but the systems were largely independent. The result
was that very different rules and procedures might potentially
apply to transactions or other conduct in Europe. There were
many potential voices and many jurisdictional considerations.
In the 1990s, as European integration moved into a new
phase of expansion and increased economic integration, many
called for greater predictability regarding permissible conduct
within Europe. They argued that there should be only one voice
of competition law in Europe and thus that all institutions
should apply the same law, namely, European Union law. For
some decision-makers, this was particularly important in light of
the major expansion of membership in the European Union
that would take place at the same time that modernization was
expected to go into effect. Their concern was that new Member
States have little experience with competition law or with
competitive markets in many cases, and thus without a single
voice—i.e., without certainty regarding contents—these Member
States may have even more radically different forms of
competition law and creates an even greater level of uncertainty
within the expanded EU.

9. “In order to establish a system which ensures that competition in the common
market is not distorted, Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty must be applied effectively and
uniformly in the Community.” Recital 1 of Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16
December 2002, 2003 O.J. L 1/1.
10. See David J. Gerber, The Evolution of a European Competition Law Network, in
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2002: CONSTRUCTING THE EU NETWORK OF
COMPETITION 43 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu eds., 2005).
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B. The Institutional Reshaping of Uncertainty
The modernization package did reduce uncertainty and
increase predictability in an important sense. By requiring that
EU competition law be applied in almost all cases involving
competition law in Europe, it greatly reduced divergences
among the formal rules of competition law. Although each
Member State can and usually does have its own competition
law, there are now only minor divergences from from the
substantive provisions of EU competition law, because EU law
must also be applied if the potential effects of the conduct
extend beyond the borders of a single state, and thus states have
little or no incentive to have a competition law that diverges
from EU law. This part of the story has often been told.11
Often overlooked, however, is the impact of these changes
on uncertainty. Reducing the number of independent voices
reduces potential variation in the formal substantive rules of
competition law. This eliminates many of the causes of
uncertainty that inhered in the previous non-integrated
competition law regime in Europe. Yet procedures and
institutional structures within the Member States have not been
standardized. Each Member State still has its own procedures
and institutional structures.
Recognizing the potential for divergences in the
interpretation and application of laws in this new context, the
Commission has established and supported a European
Competition Network (“ECN”), whose role is to coordinate
decisions among the various institutions and decision makers
within the European Union.12 This mechanism has served the
purpose for which it was intended. It provides a mechanism for
coordination among the competition law systems applying EU
competition law rules, and the mechanism is regularly used and
with noteworthy accomplishments. It also may, however, conceal
some of the remaining discrepancies and uncertainties. The
11. See, e.g., Gerber, supra note 2, at 187–202.
12. See generally THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK AT TEN: ORIGINS,
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ASPIRATIONS (Paul Lugard ed., 2011). For a recent discussion,
see, for example, Firat Cengiz, The European Competition Network: Structure, Management,
and Initial Experiences of Policy Enforcement (European University Institute Working
Papers Max Weber Programme 2009/05, 2009), available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/
handle/1814/11067.
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system that has been created is complex, and it is important to
recognize the sources of uncertainty within it.
1. Formalist Bias
One factor that tends to conceal the uncertainties in the
institutional system is what we can call a formalist bias in
thinking about EU competition law. The process of institutional
modernization has often diverted attention from the complex of
factors that influence actual decision-making. Since the
beginning of the modernization process, the focus of discussion
has been formal factors and relationships, and the political
rhetoric that has justified modernization has often further
emphasized these formal issues. Formal factors include the
language of statutes, the formal content of reports filed by the
Member States and the procedures for submitting them, and so
on. This was given further weight at various points in the
process. For example, during the process of approving
membership for the ten Member States that joined in 2004, the
main issues relating to competition law were formal. EU officials
who were charged with reviewing an applicant state’s
competition law had to rely on formal criteria for evaluating the
state’s readiness for admission to the European Union. They
focused on issues such as the language of the statute, the
number of cases opened by the authority, its budget, and so on.
All these things are important, and it is natural and appropriate
to focus on them. One consequence of this focus has been,
however, to draw attention away from other factors that may
create divergences within the system and from analysis of how
the system works in practice.
2. Who Decides
Public Enforcement and the Network–Institutional
modernization reduced uncertainty for businesses operating in
Europe by establishing that one set of substantive competition
law principles would generally be applicable to business conduct
wherever it occurred within EU territory. It also created a formal
procedure for allocating cases that might be handled by more
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than one national jurisdiction.13 In this procedure, there are
formal principles for deciding which competition authority may
handle a case. In most cases, this allocates cases among Member
States based on the contacts between the conduct and the State.
Some types of cases are the prerogative of the Commission, and
the Commission may also decide that it wishes to handle a
particular case that would otherwise be handled by a Member
State. The ECN is the main forum for the application of these
rules and for the negotiations that surround them. Prior to
modernization, each agency applied its own substantive rules
according to its own jurisdictional principles.14 The institutional
changes thus represent a significant increase in predictability.
Issues of who can apply which rules has become a less frequent
and generally less complicated concern of business decisionmakers.
The issue of “who decides” remains important, however,
because of the interplay of three factors. First, modernization
has made the issue of who decides a matter of regulation and
negotiation, and both regulation and negotiation involve
uncertainties relating to negotiating power, access to
information, and numerous other factors. Second, these
procedures serve to reduce conflict and uncertainty after the
conduct has occurred, but the business decision-maker must
make decisions at a point in time where the outcome of the
negotiations is unknowable. And third, there remain very
significant divergences among competition authorities
regarding the procedures to be applied and the institutional
contexts and capacities of their application (see below). Taken
together, these factors may create potentially significant
uncertainty for business decision makers.
Private enforcement and the limits of the Network—When
the potential for private enforcement of competition laws is
added to this mix, uncertainties increase further. National
courts in Europe are not part of the ECN, and they are far less
13. For analysis, see David J. Gerber & Paolo Cassinis, The “Modernisation” of
European Community Competition Law: Achieving Consistency in Enforcement—Part I, 27
EUR. COMP. L. REV. 10 (2006); David J. Gerber & Paolo Cassinis, The “Modernisation” of
European Community Competition Law: Achieving Consistency in Enforcement—Part II, 27
EUR. COMP. L. REV. 51, 51 (2006).
14. See Gerber, supra note 10.
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susceptible to Commission control and influence than are
national competition authorities. Here, there is no formal
mechanism in place to coordinate jurisdictional claims. Private
litigants can choose courts as they wish based on factors such as
procedural advantages and disadvantages of one court
procedure over another, varying interpretations of European
law among the courts, etc. This means that institutional
divergences may play an important role in their choices and
thus that there is less uniformity in the application of the formal
rules than might appear from the formal structures themselves.
Private litigation in Europe is still relatively new and relatively
infrequent, but in some countries the number of private
competition lawsuits has increased significantly in recent years.
The European Commission has fostered this expansion of
private litigation, but the success of these efforts may often
counteract or undermine the predictability and uniformity goals
that the Commission has pursued in its procedural and
substantive modernization efforts.15
3. Institutional Divergences
The issue of “who decides” increases in importance to the
extent that the procedural and institutional factors that
influence decision-making diverge. If all procedures and
institutional factors were standardized, the uncertainty would be
of little concern, but the greater the divergences, the more
salient are the uncertainties associated with applying the
competition law. Although some in the Commission realized
even at the beginning of the process that procedural disparities
could undermine the effects of modernization, political
opposition at the Member State level prevented procedural
standardization from being part of the package.16
15. For a valuable set of articles on these and related enforcement issues, see THE
ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW IN EUROPE (Thomas M. J. Möllers & Andreas
Heinemann eds., 2008).
16. See generally Mario Monti, Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, in
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2001: EFFECTIVE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF EC
ANTITRUST LAW 3 (Claus Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu eds., 2003). See also
Hannah L. Buxbaum, German Legal Culture and the Globalization of Competition Law: A
Historical Perspective on the Expansion of Private Enforcement, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 101,
101 (2005); Damien M.B. Gerard, Regulation 1/2003 (and Beyond): Balancing Effective
Enforcement and Due Process in Cross-Border Antitrust Investigations, in INTERNATIONAL
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As a result, there are major institutional and procedural
divergences among the institutions applying competition law in
Europe. Institutional divergences involved issues such as, for
example, the amount of resources devoted to competition law,
the political support for competition law, the independence of
the institutions from external interference, hiring practices, and
the economic, linguistic capacities of decision-makers. Each of
these factors can play a significant role in how competition law is
understood and in particular how specific cases are handled.
Similarly, each institution has its own procedures. These
determine factors such as, for example, the extent of data
available for analysis, the control of the data and of its
presentation to relevant decision-makers, the roles assigned to
economists and the procedural context within which they can
present their work, how decision making is organized, who is
allowed to be heard and under what circumstances and so on.17
These factors play important roles in influencing the actual
outcomes of the application of competition law in the numerous
institutions that apply that law.
4. Institutional Relationships
Relationships among European institutions are important
not only from the standpoint of who decides, but from the
standpoint of what institutions may exert influence over
decisions and what mechanisms are available to them for
exerting influence. Prior to modernization, Europe’s
competition law institutions generally had minimal contact with
each other, and there were few incentives to seek collaboration
or to follow advice or practices of other institutions. That all
changed in the wake of modernization. The creation of the ECN
greatly increased the intensity and importance of relationships
both between the Commission and national competition
authorities and among the national competition authorities
themselves. These relationships became part of the negotiating
process for decisions within the ECN. This has created strong
ANTITRUST LITIGATION: CONFLICT OF LAWS AND COORDINATION 437(Jurgen Basedow et
al. eds., 2012).
17. For an example, see Andrea M. Klees, Breaking the Habits: The German
Competition Law after the 7th Amendment to the Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB), 7
GERMAN L.J. 399 (2006).
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incentives for Member State authorities and individual decision
makers within those authorities to seek connections and
influence with others in the network. As a result, institutional
relationships are now a major factor influencing decisions, and
these types of influences are seldom open for public scrutiny
and thus can create an additional level of complexity and
uncertainty.
This brief review of some of the elements and impacts of
institutional modernization reveals that it has reduced a key set
of factors creating uncertainty about the norms of competition
in Europe. In the process, however, it has introduced new forms
of uncertainty and reshaped the overall contours of uncertainty.
In order to make predictions about competition law’s content,
therefore, it becomes necessary to look in the right places—to
seek predictability where it exists, and this will often be in places
other than those generally assumed to be relevant.
III. SUBSTANTIVE MODERNIZATION: THE LIGHT AND
SHADOWS OF ECONOMICS
The substantive component of modernization has also been
seen as a means of reducing uncertainty, and it has reduced one
form of uncertainty. It has provided a central conceptual base
for thinking about competition law in Europe and thereby
reduced the uncertainties resulting from an unstructured variety
of ways of approaching competition law. This has been of much
value, but it has not eliminated uncertainty in this area. It has
relocated it and altered its contours. As with its institutional
counterpart, the “more economic approach” (MEA) has played
a central role in thought and discussions of competition law
since the mid-1990s. It has been at the core of most discussions
of what competition law in Europe is and what its objectives are
and should be.18 As we shall see, these two forms of
modernization have major implications not only for competition
law, but for the future of European integration.
Although the two forms of modernization are interrelated
and have had similar impacts, they represent two very distinct
forms of legal change. Institutional modernization occurred
18. See, e.g., Anne C. Witt, From Airtours to Ryanair: Is the More Economic Approach to
EU Merger Law Really About More Economics?, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 217 (2012).
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through a formal process of changing the procedural
regulations of the EU. The proposed changes were clearly
articulated, and representatives of the Member States were
informed of the Commission’s plans and had to give their
formal assent in order for the reforms to be instituted. In
contrast, substantive modernization has evolved as a change in
thinking about competition policy within the European
Commission, and this change in thinking has spread from the
Commission to other institutions in varying ways and with
various levels of penetration. Most involved with competition law
in the European Union recognize the basic idea behind the
change, but many remain uncertain about its details. This has
led to major issues involving the degree to which other EU and
Member State institutions accept the Commission’s views in this
area.
A. Content and Contours of Substantive Modernization—The More
Economic Approach
The central idea behind substantive modernization and the
MEA is that economics should play a greater role in the
development and application of European competition law.
What that greater role should be remains a subject of
controversy. “How much more?” “More than what?” Views differ
on these questions. Moreover, the term “MEA” and the idea
behind it have tended to polarize opinion. For some, it has
become a shibboleth; for others, it functions as a semi-sacred
talisman.19 The debate has become freighted with emotional
baggage, which has further exacerbated the uncertainty. We
need, therefore, to briefly review the basics of that evolution.

19. For discussion and comparison, see, for example, Ioannis Lianos, Categorical
Thinking in Competition Law and the “Effects-Based” Approach in Article 82 EC, in ARTICLE
82 EC: REFLECTIONS ON ITS RECENT EVOLUTION 19, 19 (Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2009);
Christian Ahlborn & Jorge Padilla, From Fairness to Welfare: Implications for the Assessment
of Unilateral Conduct under EC Competition Law, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW
ANNUAL 2007: A REFORMED APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82 EC 55, 55 (Claus-Dieter
Ehlermann & Mel Marquis eds., 2008). For a valuable collection of articles on the issue,
see ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMPETITION LAW (Josef Drexel et al. eds, 2009).
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1. The Commission’s Role
During the 1990s EU competition officials began to call for
changes in European competition law that would introduce
greater use of economics into European competition law. These
efforts were related to major changes in US antitrust law that
began in the 1970s and radically changed its substantive
content.20 That development moved economics to a central
normative role in US antitrust law. The basic criterion of the law
was whether conduct could be clearly identified as having
specific economic effects. Economists and legal scholars in the
United States created a powerful literature that demonstrated
how form-based rules—i.e., rules based on the characteristics of
the conduct itself—could lead to competition law decisions that
harmed rather than protected competition. The basic insight
was that the effects on competition of conduct by a firm with
market power differ from the effects produced by the same
conduct engaged by a firm without market power. Competition
law rules based on the form of the conduct itself could therefore
lead to market interventions that discouraged competitive
conduct—the opposite of protecting competition. The claim was
that competition law should intervene in the economic process
only where specific conduct under specific circumstances could
be clearly shown through the tools of economic science to harm
the competitive process. From this perspective, conduct that had
been considered a violation of European competition law on the
basis of previously existing form-based rules appeared
inappropriate and potentially harmful to the European
economy.
Commission officials began to take these arguments
seriously as institutional modernization was moving forward and
in the context of impending major expansion of the European
Union.21 They revised regulations to include a greater normative
role for economics and more scrutiny of the effects of conduct
and less concern with their form. Initially the new approach
focused on vertical restraints, but the changes soon also altered
20. For comparative discussion, see David J. Gerber, Comparative Antitrust Law, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1193 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., 2006); David J. Gerber, Competition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
LEGAL STUDIES 510 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003).
21. See, e.g., Gerber, supra note 2, at 187–204.
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assessment of mergers and of horizontal agreements. Although
Commission leaders have also introduced more economicsbased analysis into the assessment of dominance, the impact of
the changes has been less clear in this area of competition law.
From the outset of this process, one of the main
justifications for these changes has been the potential of an
MEA to unify, standardize, and give greater predictability to
competition law.22 An economics-based competition law was cast
as a single, conceptual and normative framework for
competition law throughout the European Union. This also
symbolized a higher level of European integration and at the
same time sought to assure that the new Member States did not
develop their own conceptions of competition law. There was
concern among Commission officials and others that if many
new competition authorities were now included in the European
Union, this could increase uncertainty and lead to major
divergences between and among competition laws of the
Member States. The normative use of economics was seen as a
means of avoiding or at least significantly reducing this potential
for diversity and uncertainty. Economics, it was claimed, was a
clear conceptual framework for competition law. If, therefore,
every Member State followed the economic approach, there
would be little basis for divergence and its resulting
uncertainties.
2. Reception by Other Institutions
The Commission initiated this form of modernization, and
it has remained the driving force behind the drive for more
economics. This central role is a key to understanding the
dynamics of competition law in Europe today, because other
institutions responsible for interpreting and applying EU
competition law have moved at varying paces in seeking to
understand the Commission’s views on the role of economics
and to absorb this set of ideas in their own decisional practices.
Many competition law decision-makers and scholars are unsure
of how to use economics and how much to use economics.
22. See, e.g., Götz Drauz, A View from Inside the Merger Task Force: Comments on
“Reforming European Merger Review: Targeting Problem Areas in Policy Outcomes”, 2 J.
INDUS., COMPETITION & TRADE 391, 391–99 (2002).
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Others have not been convinced that this approach is
appropriate for the European Union, at least in its present form.
This has led to lively debate for more than a decade about what
the more economic approach is and what its consequences are
likely to be.23
All European institutions appear to have accepted the basic
idea that effects should be considered in applying EU
competition law, at least most of the time, but their acceptance
of a normative role for economics is far from even. The two EU
courts have used some of the concepts of the MEA at times, but
not always consistently or clearly.24 The decisions and positions
of Member State competition authorities (“NCAs”) also vary
widely. Some accept and apply the more economic approach
principles on more or less the same basis as does the
Commission, while the decisions of other NCAs are far less
consistent with this view. National courts often remain resistant
to extensive use of economics in evaluating competition law
cases.
B. The More Economic Approach and the Transformation and
Relocation of Uncertainty
The Commission has achieved many of the goals that it had
associated with increased use of economics in European
competition law. Use of economics as a point of reference has in
itself reduced the uncertainties that arise whenever numerous
institutions with differing goals, agendas, and backgrounds
apply law in a particular area. It has also created an important
conceptual anchor for competition law that has generated
stability in the context of EU expansion. To this extent,
therefore, the MEA has successfully reduced uncertainty.
It has, however, also transformed uncertainty and relocated
it, and this aspect of the use of economics is often overlooked.
Failure to recognize this aspect of substantive modernization can
23. See, e.g., Röller, supra note 8, at 13. See also the collections of articles in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW (Einer R. Elhauge ed.,
2012) and in COMPETITION POLICY AND THE ECONOMIC APPROACH (Josef Drexl et al.
eds., 2011).
24. For an example, see Kelyn Bacon, European Court of Justice Upholds Judgment of
the European Court of First Instance in the British Airways/Virgin Saga, 3 COMPETITION
POL’Y INT’L 227, 227 (2007).
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lead to misconceptions and misunderstandings that can have
significant impacts on competition law in the European Union.
We look briefly, therefore, at this aspect of modernization, the
obstacles to understanding it, and the potential consequences of
failure to grasp it more effectively.
1. Language, Methods, and Outcomes: Unraveling the
Relationships
A valuable starting point for analyzing this transformation is
a focus on the uncertainties within economics itself. As a
science, economics offers a language and a set of methods that
can be used in evaluating and predicting economic phenomena.
On its face, therefore, “more economics” means no more than
increased use of this language and methodology. This basic
observation brings into higher relief a central source of
misunderstanding about the MEA and about the discrepancies
between promises and expectations relating to it, on the one
hand, and the outcomes it has produced, on the other.
Use of economic language and methodology can provide a
framework for thinking about competition law.25 To the extent
that economics is used for particular functions, it structures
discussion and limits the range of perspectives that can be
brought to bear on the performance of that function. The
standardizing impact of economics operates, therefore, at the
conceptual and linguistic level. This means that its potential
value for standardizing outcomes depends on the objectives for
which it is being used, the persons and institutions that use it,
and the conditions of its use. “More economics” may not
necessarily, therefore, limit the range of potential outcomes in
competition law. It has the potential to play that role, but
whether it does so depends on how and by whom it is used.

25. For discussion and examples, see Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of
Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L. J. 471 (2012);
Ioannis Lianos, ‘Judging’ Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation—A
European view, in THE REFORM OF EC COMPETITION LAW: NEW CHALLENGES 185
(Ioannis Lianos & Ioannis Kokkoris eds., 2010); see also MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION
POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 17–31 (2004).
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2. The Diverse Roles of Economics
A key to analyzing the transformation of uncertainty
through the MEA is to perceive, identify, and untangle the
differing roles that economics can play in competition law.26 I
here identify three main functions that economics performs in
competition law systems and examine some of the factors that
are likely to influence their potential for supporting
standardization.
One is the role of economics in describing—i.e., assembling
and interpreting data and identifying and quantifying
relationships among economic variables. Economists are trained
to structure data for purposes of more precise analysis and to
identify the actual and potential effects of conduct on other
economic variables. Their training prepares them to perform
these tasks effectively and thoroughly. Their role is thus
primarily descriptive. This function is valuable for competition
law decision-makers, and thus they have incentives to employ
economists to provide this kind of information.
This descriptive function does not necessarily limit the
range of outcomes from the application of competition law and
lead toward standardization of the substantive norms of
competition law. The use of economics to describe facts can
serve any competition law or regulatory goals. It merely
increases the amount and quality of information available for
use by the decision-makers. It does not itself dictate the
purposes for which the information is used. Moreover, many
other factors influence how the tools of economics are
employed. The use of economics to gather and interpret factual
data is costly. How much description can be performed by
economists depends on the resources available to the
competition law system using them. In addition, these costs are
born by different actors in the system, and these actors have
varying incentives. This means that there will virtually always be
major differences in the amount and quality of description
among competition law systems.
26. For analysis of the embeddedness of economics in procedural and
institutional frameworks, see David J. Gerber, Competition Law and the Institutional
Embeddedness of Economics, in ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMPETITION LAW, supra note 19,
at 20.
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A second role for economics is normative. Here economics
provides the basic norms of competition law. For our purposes,
identifying this as a separate function is critically important,
because failure to distinguish it from other functions of
economics can render analysis confusing, at best, and
misleading, at worst. I use the term “normative role” to refer to
the role of economics as a source of competition law norms. In
this role, economics determines to a greater or lesser extent the
substantive content of competition law—“Does conduct violate
the law or not?” In US antitrust law, economics plays this role to
a very significant extent. If economics determines, for example,
that conduct has increased a price above a competitive price, the
conduct will generally be considered to have violated the law. If
it does not, this generally precludes a finding of antitrust
violation. Economics is, of course, filtered through and applied
by legal institutions, but the basic proposition is that conduct
violates competition law if and only if it causes or can be
expected to have specified economic effects.
A third potential role for economics is seldom identified
clearly, but there is much analytical value in doing so—
methodological discipline. This use provides support for
standardization while maintaining avenues for disciplined
differences among competition law regimes. In this use,
economic methodology provides a channeling mechanism that
can reduce the range of variation in the norms of competition
law systems while at the same time enabling and identifying
variations within that range.
Economic methods can narrow the range of decisions
related to a specific legal function precisely because the use of
such methods requires that certain kinds of questions be asked
and particular kinds of analyses be used. Methods impose
requirements on decision-making, and they impose obligations
on decision-makers. These requirements and obligations
constrain the discretion of decision-makers either directly or
indirectly (by exposing deviations from the methods).
Identifying these related, but quite distinct, roles for
economics in competition law helps to clarify the potential for
differences in competition law outcomes resulting from the
objectives for which economics is used and the functions for
which it is employed.
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3. Diverse Institutional Dynamics
Each function that economics performs is influenced by the
institutional dynamics of the institution performing the
function.27 As noted above, the actual impact of economics on
competition law decisions depends on who is using it, for what
purposes, and subject to which conditions and influences. Each
institution—whether the European Commission, an NCA, or a
court—has its own agenda, its own configuration of resources
and capacities, and a specific set of factors that shape the
preferences of decision makers—e.g., incentives for promotion.
Individual decision-makers within the institution also have
varying degrees of knowledge and capacity relating to the use of
economics in the competition law content, and they have
differing individual and collective experiences in using it. These
shape expectations regarding the MEA and, in turn, this shapes
incentives to use it—or not—in particular ways.
4. Diverse Procedures
Procedural mechanisms differ significantly along numerous
criteria that affect the way economics is used.28 For example,
there are significant differences in the degree to which data is
available to decision-makers who wish to apply economic
methodology. The value of economic methodology often
depends on how much data is available for the economist to use,
how much control the economist has over the investigation and
procurement, and so on. Economists also play varying roles in
institution. In some, they may be given significant roles in the
decision-making process and/or significant opportunities to
influence decision-makers. In other enforcement institutions,
economists may have limited roles and limited status within the

27. For comparative analysis of procedural functions, see David J. Gerber,
Comparing Procedural Systems: Toward an Analytical Framework, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A
MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN 665 (James A.R.
Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds, 2002).
28. For discussion, see, for example, Andrew I. Gavil, The Challenges of Economic
Proof in a Decentralized and Privatized European Competition Policy System: Lessons from the
American Experience, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 177 (2008); Oles Andriychuk,
Rediscovering the Spirit of Competition: On the Normative Value of the Competitive Process, 6
EUR. COMPETITION J. 575 (2010).
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institution. In courts, they seldom have direct access to decisionmakers at all.
5. Relationships among Institutions
Relationships among institutions may also influence the way
economics is used. Procedural modernization created a network
of relationships among Member State as well as between the
European Commission and Member State competition
authorities. These relationships may influence the degree to
which economists have access to data from other jurisdictions,
the extent to which they can coordinate their efforts with the
efforts of those controlling and/or interpreting data in other
jurisdictions, and so on. There are also less formal networks of
economists within Europe and internationally that have varying
degrees of status and influence relating to these institutional
relationships. Moreover, national courts have varying
relationships to the national competition authorities as well as
varying views of their obligations to follow Commission decisions
and guidance regarding the use of economics in competition
law cases.
6. External Factors
The application of economics methodology in competition
law institutions is also influenced by a variety of factors that are
external to the institutions themselves, but that nonetheless can
have a significant impact on decision-making within it.29 The
structure and characteristics of the economics profession in the
jurisdiction and its relationship to the competition law
institutions can, for example, have important effects on the use
of economics in those institutions. Economics as a profession is
international in some senses, but European jurisdictions vary
significantly in the extent to which economists as a profession
are organized in ways that support and promote the use of
economics in competition law institutions. Even the term
“economist” (and its cognates) is defined in differing ways.
Sometimes it refers only to holders of PhD degrees, while in
29. See, e.g., David J. Gerber, Convergence in the Treatment of Dominant Firm Conduct:
The United States, the European Union, and the Institutional Embeddedness of Economics, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 951 (2010).
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others it includes those who have the equivalent of masters level
(or even less) training in economics. Often these differences in
institutional influences and incentives are overlooked in
analyzing the role of economics in competition law in Europe.
C. Identifying Uncertainty Issues
Substantive modernization succeeded in reducing one form
of uncertainty—the uncertainty that resulted from having
divergent conceptual bases for competition law in Europe. By
providing a defined and unified conceptual reference point for
competition, it has been of much value. As we have seen,
however, it did not eliminate other types of uncertainty, and it
introduced a new set of uncertainties.
The brief review here of some of these sources of
uncertainty should not detract from the value of economics as a
decisional framework, but it does elucidate some of the factors
that influence its actual operations and create divergences and
uncertainties within Europe. It reveals the need for a more
nuanced view of the role of economics and economists in
European competition law.
The combined effect of these two forms of modernization
has been, therefore, to restructure and relocate uncertainty
about competition law in Europe, and understanding EU
competition law is today in large part about understanding what
has changed and where and how these new uncertainty factors
operate and how they influence decisional outcomes.
Traditional lenses based on the operation of law in a single
country often miss and/or distort these factors, and thus the
new situation calls for modifications of these lenses.
IV. IMPROVING THE LENSES: DYNAMICS AND DECISIONS IN
THE EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW SYSTEM
In this Part, I outline a basic framework that addresses these
potential distortions and inadequacies in the lenses used to view
European competition law in the wake of procedural and
substantive modernization.30 It alters the focus and tools of
30. This analysis is outlined in David J. Gerber, System Dynamics: Toward a
Language of Comparative Law?, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 719 (1998).
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analysis in ways that correspond to the changes brought about
by these two forms of modernization. This necessarily entails
altering some of the questions asked and organizing knowledge
in ways that respond to these questions.
A. Embedded Decisions as the Basis for Analysis
The starting point for enhancing the effectiveness of
analysis is fundamental to the rest of the analysis. If the analysis
starts from more traditional ways of viewing the material, such as
focusing on what potentially relevant texts say, the results are
likely to be suboptimal. As we have seen, in a context in which
decisions are made by diverse and often quite different
institutions and players, texts may be viewed, used, and applied
in varying ways throughout the European system. As a result, the
starting point may obscure questions that need to be asked in
order to be in a position to predict decisions about what the law
is.
When we change the starting point for the analysis and
begin with the decisions themselves, the picture changes. This
move reveals relevant questions that more traditional forms of
analysis tend to marginalize. Starting with texts suggests that
there is a single voice—“the law.” Yet, there is no single voice in
European competition law today. There are numerous
institutions making claims about what the law is and/or using
varying reference points in applying the provisions of law. The
focus of analysis should, therefore, be the decisions that
represent what law is in potentially relevant contexts. This is
what those interested in European competition law—whether
practicing legal professionals, business advisors, or others—need
to know. Thinking about competition law after modernization
requires foregrounding the diversity of influences on decisions
among the institutions applying the law.
The focus on decisions naturally leads to questions about
the factors that influence those decisions. These kinds of
questions tend to be treated unsystematically in traditional
thinking about law. Often they are little more than anecdotal
considerations. They may be mentioned, but they are seldom
studied in ways that reveal patterns that can be useful in
predicting decisions. The assumption is often that they are
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secondary issues that are not susceptible to organization and
effective analysis.
They can, however, be studied in ways that provide a basis
for predicting future decisions and thus ascertaining “the law in
operation.” I have suggested elsewhere one way of generating
structure into the data that allows it to be systematically
studied.31 It can reveal information that does assist in knowing
and advising about what the law is. I refer to this form of analysis
as “system dynamics.” It gives structure to the data and thereby
enhances the users’ capacity to perceive relationships among
decisional factors and thus more effectively predict outcomes. It
groups decisional influences into four main categories. They are
related to each other at the point of individual decisions. Some
examples are below.
B. Localizing Decisions
Applying this analysis in the EU competition law context
emphasizes the need to localize decisions that may be relevant
to particular forms of conduct in particular situations. Who is
deciding? Given the variety of institutional voices in the
modernized competition law system, it is necessary to know
where to look in thinking about what will happen in a specific
situation. Outcomes may vary significantly, depending, for
example, on whether the relevant decision-maker is the
European Commission or a court in a specific Member State.
C. Decisional Influences
This allows us to identify and isolate the influences on those
decisions. These influences are interrelated in actual decisionmaking, but they can be identified separately, and patterns of
interaction among them can also be identified.
Authoritative Texts—One set of decisional influences
consists of the texts that are considered authoritative by the
institutions involved—e.g., statutes, regulations, and judicial
opinions. They express the authority that is central to the
application of law.32 To the extent they are considered
31. Id.
32. “Text” here refers to a set of linguistic meaning units (usually “words”) that is
basically fixed. In modern systems texts are typically written, but a text may also refer be
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authoritative by a set of decision-makers they constrain decisionmaking within that group and relate the decisions of each to
those of the others. Each institution within the European Union
has its own configuration of authoritative texts, and recognizing
their distinctive roles yields insights into the decision-making
process. One consists of texts that are authoritative for all
Member States’ institutions—i.e., texts produced by the
European Union itself. These foster standardization among the
Member States, but each Member State also relies on another
set of texts which is considered authoritative only for its own
institutions, and they often diverge extensively from each other.
EU texts provide the basis for claims about what the law is
in Europe. They represent a framework that is expected to relate
decisions throughout European institutions to each other, and
thus it is the strongest tie among the institutions and the most
influential constraint on the decisions that are likely to be made.
In the European Union the relevant treaties provide the overall
framework for reference in competition law, but they are quite
general and abstract, with the result that more specific texts
become primary reference points. These include regulations
and directives that vary significantly in their level of specificity
and thus of guidance to decision-makers.
Each Member State has its own set of potentially relevant
texts, however, and these are not a common reference point for
all, but a factor of variation. Some of these may relate to fact
patterns that may be covered by EU texts, but may be
inconsistent with them. Although the competition law statutes of
the Member States now align closely with EU level provisions,
some differences remain.33 There may also be other regulatory
or constitutional factors that overlap with competition law
provisions. For example, domestic intellectual property
provisions sometimes relate to conduct that is also covered by

maintained by oral or other forms of tradition. For further discussion, see David J.
Gerber, Authority Heuristics and Legal Knowledge, in ORDINARY LANGUAGE AND LEGAL
LANGUAGE (Barbara Pozza ed., 2005), reprinted and revised in David J. Gerber, Authority
Heuristics and Legal Knowledge, 79 CHI-KENT L. REV. 959 (2004).
33. For examples related to Art. 102 (abuse of dominance), see EUROPEAN
COMPETITION LAW: THE IMPACT OF THE COMMISSION’S GUIDANCE ON ARTICLE 102
(Lorenzo F. Pace ed., 2011).
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competition law.34 Finally, as noted above, there are institutional
and procedural regimes in each state that may affect the way the
texts of EU law are interpreted and applied.
Institutions—Institutions create their own set of influences
on legal decisions. They subject decision-makers to pressures
and incentives. Each is part of a structure of authority, and each
contains its own internal structure of authority. These varying
structures influence who is heard by decision-makers and the
kinds of influence individuals can have on decisions within the
institution. For example, they create authority relationships
which determine whose views are to be given weight within the
institution or can be considered to represent the institution. In
addition, each institution has its own decision-making
procedures, hiring and career advancement structures, and its
own set of relationships with other institutions, both public and
private.
As we have seen, institutions that apply competition law in
the EU context differ significantly in each of these ways. At the
EU level itself, there are two very different sets of institutions
that make authoritative decisions about competition law—the
EU Commission and the EU courts. They differ along many
axes. For example, the responsibilities of the institutions, the
training and backgrounds of the decision-makers, their personal
and shared agendas, and their incentives diverge significantly.
The two EU courts play authoritative roles in European
competition law, but they have not always been consistent with
each other, and to some extent these differences may reflect
differences in their respective roles and agendas as well as other
factors such as differences in appointment procedures and
priorities.35
The Commission has its own structures, responsibilities,
influences, and incentives, which are quite different from those
of the courts. Moreover, its competition decisions are influenced
34. See, e.g., Josef Drexl, AstraZeneca and the EU Sector Inquiry: When Do Patent
Filings Violate Competition Law? (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property &
Competition Law Research Paper No. 12-02, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2009276.
35. See generally THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE:
ANALYSES AND PERSPECTIVES ON SIXTY YEARS OF CASE-LAW (Allan Rosas et al. eds.,
2013).
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by the structures and institutions within the Commission. The
European Commission is the bureaucracy of the European
Union and has responsibility for all EU policies and objectives. It
must approve major decisions in the competition law area, and
it must consider the effects of these major decisions on other
areas of European law. The Commissioner for competition is
primarily responsible for competition policy, and s/he must
consider both the intra-European as well as extra-European
consequences of decisions. The Directorate-General for
Competition must interpret existing EU law, develop
competition policy, interact with other parts of the EU
bureaucracy, and apply the law. Finally, the Legal Service of the
European Commission has responsibility for aligning the
Commission’s decisions with EU law, and in many cases it must
approve decisions taken by the competition directorate.
The institutions of the Member States—the courts and the
competition authorities—differ in similar ways both in relation
to the EU institutions and in relation to each other. Each
Member State institution has its own dynamics and is subject to
its own configuration of influences. They are influenced by the
political and economic context of the country, its size, its
history, its educational system, and the like. The ECN has
opened avenues of greater understanding and coordination
among these institutions, but divergences in institutional
dynamics remain highly significant.
Communities—A third type of influence on legal decisionmaking is found in patterns of “community” within legal
systems. I use the term “community” to refer to regularized
patterns of relationship—here, among actors that affect
competition law decisions. Who talks with whom? Who has
status, etc.? This concept of community includes not only
officials within the institutions, but also others who talk with
competition law decision-makers and have status in the eyes of
those decision-makers. For example, professors of law and of
economics, as well as academic and private economists, often
talk on a regular basis with competition officials, and
competition officials often respect their views. Each of these
factors can significantly impact decisions. Decisional analysis can
investigate these patterns of status and communication among
those who make or influence competition law decisions.
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Patterns of thought—A fourth category of influence
includes patterns of thought and discourse within legal
communities. These may include, for example, established
orthodoxies about how to analyze competition law issues. For
example, resistance to substantive modernization is often
associated with existing patterns of thought that focus on the
primacy of textual analysis in applying law. Such patterns
condition how decision-makers identify and evaluate relevant
data, their perception of particular kinds of evidence, their
expectations regarding the roles of courts and administrators
and so on. Patterns of thought can be identified and analyzed by
examining the language and decisions of relevant actors, both in
writing and in oral communications.
D. Decisional Analysis as an Analytical Framework
This brief look at factors that influence decisions in the
modernized European competition law is revealing. Each of the
factors plays a role, and they are all interrelated. This
emphasizes the potential value of an analysis structured around
decisions and influences on those decisions. This form of
analysis structures the data necessary for predicting decisions
and reducing uncertainty. It reflects the multi-voice character of
the European competition law system, and it emphasizes the
need to place decisions in the context of the complex legal
relationships that constitute the system of competition law in
Europe.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This analysis of the transformations of uncertainty in
European competition law since the late 1990s reveals the extent
of the changes that have occurred and the need for more
effective ways of analyzing and understanding competition law
in Europe. The modernizations were intended to reduce certain
kinds of uncertainties and to increase predictability and
uniformity of law within the European Union. They have done
that, but they have also reshaped, transformed, and relocated
uncertainty, creating new forms of uncertainty in the process of
eliminating or reducing others. Moreover, the modernizations
and the search for greater certainty they represent have
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sometimes also obscured the consequences of these changes,
making uncertainty less visible and thus more difficult to
penetrate.
It is critically important, therefore, to develop ways of
thinking about European competition law that identify and
comprehend these uncertainties. As we have seen, the use of
lenses that are not designed for this post-modernization context
tend to obscure the causes of uncertainty and its many political
and other implications. If one views modernized European
competition law with lenses that were developed for national
systems or for European competition law as it operated prior to
the modernizations, the lenses may distort the realities that
those modernizations have created. The two forms of
modernization of European competition law were a response to
changes in the European Union and in the world surrounding
it. Those changes are likely to continue, and thus recognizing
the new dimensions of uncertainty and developing analytical
approaches to deal with it represent an urgent challenge.

